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What is the impact of terrorism on trade through higher security at the borders? We set up a theory which 
shows that the impact goes not only from terrorism to trade; higher trade with a partner might, in turn, 
increase the probability of terrorism acts and make security measures more costly for total welfare. In order 
to identify the true impact of terrorism, our theory allows then for a strategy to condition out the latter 
mechanism. We show in particular how past incidents perpetrated in third countries (anywhere in the world 
except the origin or targeted country) constitute good exogenous factors for current security measures at the 
borders. Our tests suggest that terrorist incidents have a small effect on US imports on average, but a much 
higher effect for those origin countries at the top of the distribution of incidents. In addition, the level of the 
impact is up to three times higher when the acts result in a relatively high number of victims, the products 
are sensitive to shipping time, and the size of the partner is small. The paper further shows how terrorism 
affects the number of business visas delivered by the Unites States, thereby impacting significantly U.S. 
imports in differentiated products. These results suggest that security to prevent terrorism does matter for 
trade. 
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In his 2003 Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection at the Department of Homeland Security in the US, stated:
”We must protect American lives, but we must also protect American livelihoods–our
economy. That’s why we have twin goals: (1) increasing security and (2) facilitating
legitimate trade and travel.”
After the events of September 11, the US decided to strengthen the security at its borders against
transnational terrorism. In April 2004, it signed with the EU a customs cooperation agreement to
extend the Container Security Initiative throughout the EU. In this agreement, US customs oﬃcers
could operate in some ports of the European Union to screen and control all cargos to the US that
depart from or transit through the European countries (Archick (2005)). To date, several countries
have already implemented these measures and other important ports are expected to comply, in
particular after the recent London attacks of July 7, 2005. Although more controversial, the two
partner authorities also reached other agreements in air transport by which they increase identity
controls over the borders. Hence, airlines have to provide the US authorities with the identities of the
passengers from or via the EU before departure while the latter have now to prove their identity via
biometric identiﬁers on their passports.
Are security measures against terrorism aﬀecting international trade ﬂows, and by how much? Are
American livelihoods really aﬀected by securing their borders from terrorism? Which kind of goods,
sectors or trading partners are most aﬀected by these measures?
The purpose of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst step towards responding to these questions. First,
it sets up a simple theoretical framework linking trade, security and the probability of terrorism acts.
This theory recognizes explicitly the strategic nature of interactions between terrorist organizations
and governments of targeted countries. Second, we take our theory to the test to investigate how
terrorism incidents are aﬀecting bilateral trade and how in particular, this eﬀect is translating through
counter-terrorism security measures at the borders.
More precisely, the theory that is developed emphasizes two channels, of diﬀerent nature, linking
trade to security. First, there is the ”traditional view” that an increase in security measures could
aﬀect transaction costs and thus trade. However, our model also captures the fact that in return,
a country that is a big importer from a given economy for any given reason (proximity, big size
of exporter, diﬀerences in specialization, etc...) tends to reduce its security at its borders towards
the latter. The argument is that the related total cost of security can end up being higher than
the associated gain in the probability of preventing terrorism attacks. These two forces suggest two
important implications:
2First, trade and terrorism incidents are endogenous to each other. On the one hand, the relation-
ship is negative: terrorism via an increase in security reduces trade. But on the other hand, it can be
positive: higher trade volumes are more likely to limit security measures which in turn increases ter-
rorism activities. We propose therefore a way to condition out the latter eﬀect which would otherwise
bias downward (in absolute value) the estimated negative impact of terrorism incidents on bilateral
trade. What we do is to consider a particular type of incidents that we believe are the most exogenous
to security and bilateral trade. These are past incidents perpetrated by groups originating from a
country against the interests of another, but which take place in a third country. As an example,
take for instance the case of Al-Qaeda in 1998, whose origin at that time was still attributed to Saudi
Arabia1. In that year, Al-Qaeda managed to explode a car bomb next to the U.S. embassy in Dar
El-Salam (Tanzania), which hurt nearly 80 people. We make the point here, that with such types of
incidents, based in third countries (here, Tanzania), we are capable to identify the exogenous impact
of terrorism originating from one country (here, Saudi Arabia) on its bilateral exports towards the
targeted country (here, the US).
Second, if transnational terrorism induces security reactions directed towards countries from which
the incidents emanate, then trade should be aﬀected diﬀerently across countries and products. In-
deed, one may expect diﬀerent bilateral trade eﬀects with origin countries of terrorism (from where
transnational terrorism comes) than with other countries. As well, some products and sectors may
be more sensitive to bilateral security measures (like social network goods or diﬀerentiated products
a la Rauch) than others for which transaction costs are less discriminatory across countries (standard
goods and primary products). An additional route to identify the counter security eﬀect however, is
to link terrorism acts to trade through a security measure that we can observe in the data.
We investigate empirically all these issues on US bilateral imports. We have chosen this country
because it has been the main ”target” of transnational terrorism (i.e. one-third of the incidents over
the considered period target the U.S) and the one with the largest variation of ”origin” partners (more
than 95 countries have hit the U.S between 1968 and 2003). We combine, thereby, three datasets on
trade, terrorism incidents and business number of visas issued by the U.S.
First for the trade data, we use bilateral imports of the United States at the product level (SITC4/5
digits) from the NBER World Trade Data complied by Feenstra and Lipsey (2005). As it provides
only values which exceed 100,000$ per year, we have completed it with the OECD-FLUBIL bilateral
trade dataset. Disaggregated data are needed here, in particular, in order to be able to capture the
diﬀerentiated impact of counter-terrorism measures on trade across products, as mentioned above.
Besides, as it will be shown next, as both bilateral trade and terrorism activities seem to be correlated
with the relative specialization of countries, one needs to condition out this eﬀect in the regressions,
which could not have been done by using highly aggregated data.
1It might be argued that it is not the case anymore in the very recent years (say after 2000), where Al-Qaeda is
becoming more fragmented, acting as a Multinational with aﬃliates over the world.
3Second, we use the ITERATE dataset set-up by Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock and Flemming (2003)
which reports transnational terrorist activities. More precisely, ITERATE is an event-based dataset
that provides information on the date, country of localization of the attack, its origin and the targeted
country. It lists all of the incidents in the world that have been reported in the medias since 1968
onwards. We are mainly interested in those attacks where the US has been the main target, via its
representative authorities, its army or its civilians anywhere in the world.
Third, in order to prove that at least a part of the impact of terrorism is indeed translating through
counter-security measures, we use a dataset from the Department of State reporting the number of
business visas issued by the United States to each partner country from 1997 to 2002. We are in
interested here in linking the attacks to visas issuance across countries and thereby, to the induced
impact on trade in network related products.
Our empirical results are then the following. First, past terrorist events against the US, perpetrated
by groups from a given country, aﬀect negatively American imports from the latter. The eﬀect
is statistically signiﬁcant but relatively small on average. Indeed a 1% increase in past terrorism
activities from a country reduces US bilateral imports by around 0.01%. This negative eﬀect is
nonlinear however. The elasticity is higher the riskier is the country of origin in terms of its related
frequency of incidents and the number of victims. In particular, a 1% increase of past incidents from
countries such as Colombia over the period (or Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in recent years) results in
around 0.5 to 1% decrease in their exports to the US.
Second, and consistent with our theory, the impact of past terrorism on current US imports is
higher when the partner country is small in terms of its GDP size. Besides, the level of the impact
more than doubles (and hence reaches more than 1 to 2% in the case of Colombia, or more recently
Pakistan) when the acts result in a relatively high number of victims and for products that are sensitive
to the time-length of shipping and network-lengths.
Third, our paper shows how terrorism incidents aﬀect the number of business visas delivered by
the US, thereby impacting signiﬁcantly bilateral US imports, speciﬁcally in diﬀerentiated products.
This last result therefore suggests a clear channel through which counter terrorist security reactions
may aﬀect diﬀerentially bilateral trade ﬂows across US trading partners and across products.
There is a signiﬁcant literature on the economic consequences of terrorism attacks, although
not focusing on the impact of counter-security measures. In a nice survey, Frey, Luechinger and
Stutzer (2004) mention some studies that look at the impact of terrorism on diﬀerent channels of
globalization (tourism, air transport and foreign direct investment). Abadie and Gardeazabal (2005)
look also at the impact on the world economy through foreign direct investment. They argue that the
risk of terrorism in a country reduces the expected return to investment while increasing its variance.
They show that a one standard deviation increase in the risk of terrorism in a country reduces its net
4FDI position by 5%.
Our work however is more closely related to papers investigating the links between international
trade in goods and transnational terrorism2. In the aftermath of September 11, the OECD was
particularly concerned by the extent to which the world economy would be hit by the observed increase
in security surcharges emanating from airlines, maritime transport companies or insurers due to the
increase in terrorism threat (OECD (2002a), OECD (2002b)), although without giving a particular
estimate of the impact on trade. Walkenhorst and Dihel (2002) use a CGE modelling to assess more
analytically that impact on trade and welfare. The authors model the costs from a terrorist attack in
the same way as an increase in tariﬀs with the only exception that the former is not accompanied by an
additional revenue for the importing government. Where the transaction costs born from terrorism are
uniform across regions, the results show that highly opened regions and industries with high import
price-elasticities would bear a non negligible adjustment in trade and welfare losses. Another study by
Nitsh and Schumacher (2004) uses a gravity model to assess the impact on trade between two countries
which have experienced terrorism attacks. They ﬁnd that a doubling of terrorism attacks in those
countries aﬀect their trade by around 4%. Fratianni and Kang (2006) extends the analysis of Nitsh
and Schumacher (2004) to a diﬀerent time period (1980-1999) and investigate how the terrorist impact
on bilateral ﬂows interacts with geographic distance. Using the ITERATE database for the period
1968-1999, Blomberg and Hess (2006) estimate the cost of violence on bilateral trade ﬂows, considering
as well other sources of violence like external conﬂicts, revolutions, and inter-ethnic ﬁghting. They
ﬁnd that a country which has a terrorist accident is associated with a 7.6 % decline in its bilateral
trade. While signiﬁcant, this is less than half the magnitude of the negative impact on trade from
external conﬂicts and inter-ethnic conﬂicts.
All these papers however, do not deal with the impact on bilateral trade of a targeted country
whose main interests and citizens have been hit in a foreign country. As it will be shown below, a
signiﬁcant proportion of the incidents targeting rich countries is actually perpetrated either locally
(in the country of origin) or in a third location. Besides, although all these studies emphasize the
transaction cost impact of terrorism on trade, most of them do not address the possible endogeneity
between trade, terrorism and security measures neither in theory nor in the data.
As well, though not directly related to terrorism, Anderson and Marcouiller ( (1997), (2002)) focus
on the impact of insecurity on trade. In the ﬁrst paper, insecurity arises endogenously from the choice
of agents to allocate their labor between production and predatory activities, the latter hindering
international trade at the borders. In the second paper, the authors model alternatively insecurity
as a hidden tax on trade. They ﬁnd that poor institutions in terms of government transparency and
commercial legal systems hinder trade at least as much as tariﬀs. Instead, our paper model together,
the probability of terrorism occurrence (i.e. insecurity), the governments’ choice of (counter)-security
measures and trade. Less trade in such a framework does not directly come from insecurity but from
counter-terrorism security measures at the borders.
2In another paper, Mirza and Verdier (2006) provide a recent survey on these issues.
5The paper is structured in the following way. In section 2, we present the ITERATE dataset and
describe some stylized features that will be of interest to investigate the links between transnational
terrorism and bilateral trade ﬂows. Section 3 sets then a simple theoretical model of endogenous
transnational terrorism and security, embedded into a standard trade model. Section 4 explains the
induced empirical strategy to test the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. Section 5
takes the model to the test and presents the econometric results. Section 6 provides further evidence on
the impact of terrorism translating through higher security at US borders. In particular, it investigates
one speciﬁc (observable) channel of security measures at the border: the allocation of business Visas
by US authorities. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Transnational Terrorism and the ITERATE Database
ITERATE deﬁnes terrorism acts as ”the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal
violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to es-
tablished governmental authority, when such action is intended to inﬂuence the attitudes and behavior
of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties
of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of
its resolution, its ramiﬁcations transcend national boundaries”.
We amend that deﬁnition by two additional conditions to qualify an incident as ”transnational
terrorism”. Focusing ﬁrst on the term terrorism, we follow Omar Malik (2000) from the Royal Institute
of International Aﬀairs who claims that only those incidents that are perpetrated against or within
liberal states should be qualiﬁed as terrorist attacks. A country is said to be liberal when it safeguards
human rights in its laws and practices. Qualifying terrorism acts as incidents against non-liberal
countries is usually more controversial. To some observers, these actions might be viewed as terrorism
but to others, they might rather be qualiﬁed as acts of resistance against a totalitarian country. To
avoid getting into the controversy, we decided to withdraw the corresponding observations from the
dataset. We had access to the Freedom House dataset that rates civil liberties and political rights
on a scale varying between 1 and 7 for each country from the 1970s onwards, in order to distinguish
between ’liberal’ and ’non liberal’ countries. As in Helliwell (1994) and Rodrik (1999), we combine
the two ratings into an index varying between 0 and 1. The higher it is in a given year and the more
’liberal’ the observed country shall be considered. For the purpose of this paper, we retained only
those observations where incidents took place within or against a country associated with an index
equal or higher than 0.5.
Second, Mickolus et al treat some incidents perpetrated by separatist groups like ETA in the basque
country, IRA in Northern Ireland or FLNC in Corsica as transnationals, leaving the choice for the users
of the dataset to decide whether or not to include them in the data. We deﬁne instead a terrorism
incident as ”transnational” when it is directed by a group that emanates from an internationally
recognized nation against or within an internationally recognized other nation and thus withdraw
6above observations from our study.3. For instance, when the ETA group from Spain perpetrates an
incident in Spain, it shall not be considered as ’transnational’ and thus shall be withdrawn from
the data at hand. However, when the same ETA group attacks a Spanish authority, one of its
representations or Spanish civilians within another country, say France, then the observation is kept
in the dataset. That is because that type of act has some implications for security measures on the
Franco-Spanish borders.
At the end, from nearly 12,500 observations in the ITERATE dataset from 1968 to 2003, we end
up with around 10,700. We ﬁrst look at the origin of the incidents and their place of location. Before
going into details, one has to be aware that the country of origin might or might not be the country
of location of the incidents: we identify each origin by the country of ﬁrst nationality of the terrorist
group while the country of location is the country where the act has been observed in the ITERATE
dataset. In order to save space, table 1 ranks the ﬁrst 60 countries of origin by their number of
incidents over the period, although one should be aware that most if not all of the countries in the
world have been at the origin of at least one terrorist incident from 1968. The table indicates that
these countries have been related to at least 20 incidents each during the period. Besides, it is worth
mentioning that one third of total incidents have been perpetrated by unknown groups, to which no
origin have been associated.4
The country of origin as it is deﬁned here might not be that of the operations of the group. In
general, when the group does not operate in his own country it might be operating in the country
of location of the incidents (hereafter, host country)5. Therefore, it is interesting to see what is the
proportion of incidents originating from one country but that takes place in another. ITERATE
is a place-based dataset. We know exactly where and when each incident has started and ended.
In more than 95%, the location of start is the same than that of its end which makes it relatively
straightforward to locate the incidents. 6
Figure 1 sketches the distribution of the incidents extracted from the ITERATE database across 3
3It is worthwhile mentioning that we have kept incidents emanating from Palestine as the latter is already recognized
as a state by 94 nations around the world. Further, 11 more nations, generally from the OECD, grant Palestine some
speciﬁc form of diplomatic status.
4As it has been already documented in Sandler and Enders (2004), the number of incidents has decreased dramatically
after the nineties compared to the ﬁrst decade. Although experienced by most of the origin countries, this drop had
not been uniform. For instance, although groups from Palestine and Colombia had been very active during the whole
period, Lebanese and Iranien group activities had been extremely high only during the eightees and the nineties. In
recent years, it has even risen dramatically in some countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
5The case of Al-Qaeda is an exception where the country of nationality of the group (presumably Saudi-Arabia) is
diﬀerent from its presumed country of residence (’Headquarters’ in Afghanistan or Pakistan) and further diﬀerent from
many countries where its ’aﬃliates’ operate. See Clarke, 2004. That said however, following our deﬁnition of country of
origin, we have classiﬁed Al-Qaeda operations as originating from Saudi-Arabia as in Krueger and Laitin (2003). Now,
because of its aﬃliates, Al-Qaeda could have many countries of origin and this could be problematic to our study that
relates the economic impact of terrorism to the pre-identiﬁed country of origin of the groups. Now, one can still assume
that the authorities threatened by Al-Qaeda consider the islamic world as one country of origin as a whole, against which
they must secure the borders. In that case, our study can still predict of how much Al-Qaeda incidents are aﬀecting
trade between the targeted country and the muslim countries taken as a whole.
6Where the start location is diﬀerent from its end however (i.e. Aerial Hijacking), we code the host country as the
country where the incident has started.
7possible locations (Origin, Target country and Third country). The country is coded as target when
it is that of the main nationality of the victims. Nearly 80% of the victims are associated with only
one nationality over the whole period, which is why one could assign in a relatively conﬁdent way only
one target country to an incident. It is important to note here that victims, in ITERATE, are deﬁned
as ”those who are directly aﬀected by the terrorist incident by the loss of property, lives, or liberty”.
Thus, when a French embassy is hit without casualties in say, an African country, France is then coded
as the target country. Besides, the third country represents the country where the action begins albeit
diﬀerent from the origin and target states. From ﬁgure 1, we can see that only a small and relatively
stable proportion over time (10 to 20%) takes place in the targeted countries. Attacks like those of
New York (2001), Madrid (2003) and more recently London (2005) are not representative of most of
the incidents. In the earlier period, around 30 to 50% of the incidents took place in third countries
but that share declined steadily over the period to reach around 20% of the incidents. This reduction
seems to be concomitant with the rise of the share of incidents taking place in origin countries (i.e.
where they have been planned and prepared). Hence, at the end of the period, 60 to 80% of the
incidents became local. These ﬁndings are quite similar to those of Krueger and Laitin (2003) who
use the Department of State dataset to assert that, in recent years, perpetrators preferred setting-up
actions against ”targets from foreign countries [that are] close to home”. The reasons are beyond
the scope of this paper. However, even if the third country location is decreasing, it is still highly
variable and thus should still matter as much as incidents in origin and target countries for detecting
the impact on counter-security measures and trade between them.
Table 2 ranks the main 50 targeted countries over the period. The US is by far the country that
is most hit by terrorism attacks over the period, before France, Israel and Great Britain. Besides,
the distribution of incidents across targeted countries does not change much over time. A simple
calculation of the coeﬃcient of correlation between the distribution at the beginning (1968-1978) and
that at the end of the period (1997-2003) is around 0.96. It is quite simple to guess, however, that
some countries like Israel are systematically targeted by a small number of groups related to one
particular state (here Palestine)7. Can we say the same for the other most targeted countries?
Table 3 presents the top 65 ranking of ’bilateral’ incidents (i.e. ranking by origin and target
countries) wherever those incidents take place. One can easily see that over one third of the bilateral
incidents involve the US as a target country: that is, the distribution of incidents against the US is
spread over a big sample of source countries. This is obviously not the case for Israel, France or Great
Britain which are associated with at most 3 countries in the top 65. However, because of the bigger
variability of incidents against the US, this makes cross-country studies related to the US as a target
country easily implementable.
In relation to the link between transnational terrorism and bilateral trade ﬂows, two important
7One should be aware here that only incidents perpetrated by Palestine against Israel, but in a third country, or
implying victims from a third country, are reported in the ITERATE dataset. Most of the incidents between these
two countries are not reported by ITERATE however, because they are considered to be domestic, not transnational,
terrorism.
8remarks are worth making at this stage. First, over the period, and in particular before the 1990s,
the terrorist groups tend to hit targets that were relatively close to home and/or had big inﬂuence on
internal policies of origin countries: that is in particular the case of some Latin American countries
(Colombia, Puerto Rico, Peru, Cuba, Argentina) vis-` a-vis the US but also that of Algeria and Spain
vis-` a-vis France. As proximity and colony (or neo-colony) ties are also known to be factors of trade this
could give a rapid idea on why one could ﬁnd some positive relationship between terrorism activities
and bilateral trade if those factors are not correctly accounted for. In recent years however, the groups
that were the most active and that have concentrated their attacks on the US in particular, emanated
from Pakistan (100 times more between beginning and end of period), Saudi Arabia (50 times more)
and Colombia (30 times more). These extremely high ﬁgures have to be attenuated though for Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan by the fact that the activities of their groups were quasi-null in the beginning of
the period (only one attack each in the 1968-1978 period). Thus, only terrorism groups from Colombia
seem to have maintained a high intensity of their activities against the US in Latin America while a
new set of groups from countries located relatively far from the US have now signiﬁcantly intensiﬁed
theirs. As ﬁgure 1 has already suggested, note however that these groups have been mostly operating
at home.
Second, it is also interesting to see that most of the economies at the origin of the bilateral
incidents are developing countries that are mainly specialized in agriculture, natural resources and
manufacturing employing intensively those resources. Whereas countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran or
even Colombia are specialized in oil production and oil related products like plastic (especially Saudi
Arabia), Latin American countries in general (including Colombia) exploit intensively some natural
resources from agriculture and ﬁshing (Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, Chile, Puerto Rico) to mineral
resources (Peru) and mining (Chile). As diﬀerences in specialization between developing and developed
countries represent another important factor of trade, this is then another reason why one could
retrieve a positive relationship between terrorism and bilateral trade if the degree of specialization of
countries is not accounted for.
3 A Simple Model of Trade, Terrorism and Security
In this section we describe the basic elements of a simple model of trade, terrorism and security. There
is one country (the US) labelled 0 and N other countries with whom country 0 is trading.
3.1 Trade
Each country produces diﬀerentiated goods under increasing returns. The utility of a representative












9where nj is the number of varieties produced in country j, x0j is country 0 demand for a variety
of country j (all goods produced in j are demanded in the same quantity by symmetry) and σ > 1 is












where pj is the mill price of products made in j and T0j are the usual iceberg trade costs between
country 0 and country j. If one unit of good is exported from country j to country 0 only 1/T0j
units are consumed. Trade costs depend on geographical distance, trade restrictions and will also be
assumed to depend on security measures (more on this below). As is well known the value of demand







where E0 is total expenditure of country 0.
In each country, the diﬀerent varieties are produced under monopolistic competition and the entry
cost to produce in a monopolistic sector is supposed to be 1 unit of a freely tradable good which is
chosen as world numeraire. This good is produced in perfect competition. This in turn ﬁxes the wage
rate in country 0 to its labor productivity a which is assumed to be the same across countries and
across sectors under perfect and imperfect competition (for simplicity). Given this, standard mark
-up conditions from proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms give that mill prices in the monopolistic competitive
sector are identical and equal to the mark up σ/(σ−1) times marginal costs (also equal to 1). As labor
is the only factor of production, and agents are each endowed with one unit of labor, total expenditure
in country 0 is given by E0 = aL0 where L0 is the number of workers in country 0. On the supply
side, free entry implies that nj = aLj/(σ). In equilibrium, the indirect utility of the representative
consumer in country 0 is















with T0 the vector {T0j}j=0,...N of iceberg costs between country 0 and the rest of the world.
As is well known from this simple model, one gets bilateral imports of country 0 from country j




3.2 Terrorism and Security
We assume that there are K ≤ N terrorist organizations, each of them being associated to one
particular country or having headquarters located in one country. The objective of each of these
10organizations is to get visibility (which help them capture or enjoy particular political or economic
rents) In order to do this, each organization is going to spend resources to commit a terrorist event on
country 0. More precisely, we assume that a typical terrorist organization from country j maximizes
MaxRj Π(Rj,Sj)Vj − θRj (3)
where Π(Rj,Sj) is the probability of success of a terrorist act in country 0. It depends positively on the
amount of resources Rj invested by the terrorist organization and negatively on the security measures
Sj implemented by the government of country 0 against country j θ is marginal resource cost of the
terrorist organization and Vj is the perceived visibility gain enjoyed by the terrorist organization when
terrorism is successful. We assume a speciﬁc parametric form for the probability of success Π(Rj,Sj).





with the technological parameter ϕ > 0 reﬂecting the relative eﬃciency of security measures to reduce
the occurrence of terrorism.
The solution of (3) gives immediately: the reaction curve of terrorist group j








The government of country 0 is concerned both by the economic welfare of the representative
consumer U0(T0) and about the level of security Φ0 of his citizens against terrorism. To ﬁx ideas,
consider that he maximizes
W0 = LogU0(T0) + µLogΦ0
where the level of security Φ0 is a positive function of the probability of non occurence of terrorist
acts in country 0:




with R = {Rj}j=1,..K and S = {Sj}j=1,..K are respectively the vector of resources spent by terror-
ists organizations and security measures taken by the government of country 0. Security measures Sj
against terrorists residing in country j are likely to increase transactions costs on trade ﬂows (security
checks, time delays, restrictions on passports of business people, various immigration controls) and
we simply pose that
T0j = Tj(Sj) with T0
j(.) > 0
We assume that the government of country 0 forms some beliefs on the level of resources under-
11taken by terrorists from country j to commit a terrorist act in country 0 and given these beliefs (more
on this in the appendix), his problem is simply
Max{Sj} LogU0(T0) + µ ER LogΦ0(R,S)
where ER(.) reﬂects the expectation operator of government of country 0 on the vector of terrorist

































with the obvious notation that for a country j which has no terrorist organization residing there
Sj = 0and T0j = T0j(0)

























The left hand side is simply the marginal distortional cost of imposing security controls and measures.
It aﬀects trade ﬂows and, for a given country j is proportional to the level of imports m0j of country
0 from country j. The right hand side is the marginal gain of security measures on the probability
that there is no occurrence of a successful terrorist act in country 0. It is going to depend on the
structure of beliefs that the government of country 0 has on the amount of terrorist resources R spent
by terrorist organizations against country 0.
To ﬁx ideas, we take for each terrorist organization j, that the resource cost θ can take two values
θL and θH with θL < θH. Denote then νL
j and νH
j = 1 − νL
j respectively the beliefs government of






























j = R(Sj,θL) =
s
ϕSjVj
θL − ϕSj and RH
j = R(Sj,θH) =
s
ϕSjVj
θH − ϕSj (7)
The solution of (6), (5) and (7) deﬁnes then a Bayesian Nash equilibrium vector in terrorism
and security {S∗,RL∗,RH∗} = {S∗(νL),RL∗(νL),RH∗(νL)} which depends on the vector of beliefs
νL = {νL
j }j=1,..K that government 0 has on terrorist organizations. In theory, once such an equilibrium
is computed, one may have the values of trade ﬂows of country 0 with the rest of the world.
To be a bit more precise, let us consider the case where transactions costs between countries 0 and
j take an exponential form:
T0j(S) = Tj eβSj with β > 0






















θL + (1 − νL
j )
√
θH 9). In the appendix we solve for the case with K terrorist
organizations and give suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the terrorist-security game.
The case with only one terrorist group located in a particular country j can be easily illustrated
graphically with the structure of the equilibrium represented in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁrst quadrant plots the
two relationships (8) and (2). Curve (SS) represents equation (8) and is downward sloping. It shows
how the level of security measures undertaken by country 0 is reduced when the level of trade ﬂows
between country 0 and country j m0j gets larger. Conversely, curve (TT) represents equation (2) and
depicts the fact that the actual level of trade ﬂows depends negatively on security measures. These
two relationships therefore describe a two-way interaction between trade ﬂows and security measures.
Assuming, as shown in the picture that a stable equilibrium exists, it is described by point E at the
intersection of (SS) and (TT).
One may as well compute the average probability of non occurrence of a terrorist act:




















The second quadrant plots the curve (PR) describing how the average probability E(Φ0) of no

























9We assume a conﬁguration of parameters such that Sj < 4Vj/(E(
√
θ)ϕ to ensure that the SOC are satisﬁed.
13terrorism in country 0 varies with the level of security implemented in the country (equation (9)).
The equilibrium average probability of no success of terrorism is then provided by point P in ﬁgure 2.
Several simple comparative statics can be undertaken in this setting. It is easy to show that
a decrease in the expected cost of some terrorist actions E(
√
θ) or an increase in the eﬃciency of
authorities ϕ0 have a positive eﬀect on security measures undertaken at the borders (see ﬁgure 3).
Interestingly, the (TT) curve remains unaﬀected which ends-up reducing equilibrium trade ﬂows.
Besides, equation (8) shows that in return the probability of non occurrence of incidents decreases.
On the opposite, an increase say, in Lj total employment, or a decrease in some trade costs T other
than security costs, like transport costs, both tend to increase imports m0j. This however, shifts both
(TT) upward and (SS) downward. The eﬀect is a reduction of security measures S∗
j and a reduction
of the probability of non occurrence of incidents E(Φ0) (i.e. increase in the probability of provoking
an incident).
4 Estimation Strategy
What are the empirical implications of such a model? Clearly, equations (8) and (2) suggest some
endogeneity between bilateral trade ﬂows, security and bilateral terrorism. Second, in order to capture
only the relationship going from security to trade, exogenous factors that aﬀect only the security curve
(SS) are needed, holding constant all variables that aﬀect both curves (i.e. distance, common colony,
GDPs, etc...). Equation 8 is a second degree polynomial equation. Solving for security (Sj), one
can show that it directly depends on the interaction between expected marginal costs of the terrorist
organization and the eﬀectiveness of security measures, that is E(
√
θ).ϕ0. It is interesting to see then
that these measures are aﬀecting the security curve without impacting the trade curve, which makes
them very good candidates to identify our eﬀect.
Now, we do not observe the degree of eﬃciency of security measures, neither do we observe the
marginal costs of terrorist actions. To this end, we proxy the former, ϕ0, by the frequency of incidents
against the US observed in the past: All things held equal, the higher is the number of incidents
against the US compared to the total number of world incidents in the last years, the lower is its
eﬃciency to implement security measures that safeguards its citizens and interests over the world. We
also proxy the beliefs of the authorities about the eﬃciency of terrorist organizations, E(
√
θ)j by the
world share of incidents that originate from country j in the last few years. To be more precise, let
n express the total number of incidents, nj those originating from any country j, nUS those that hit
the US in whichever location in the world. Assuming T is the time horizon of the authorities and nT








Besides, the proxy of E(
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Thus, in the empirical study, these would constitute our ﬁrst 2 variables of interest. Alternatively,
















This third variable is an indicator of exogenous security against the occurrence of terrorism inci-
dents.
All three variables are based on past incidents computed from the ITERATE dataset from 1968
until 2002. Past incident-frequencies are deﬁned over 5 years (i.e. the time horizon over which
authorities formulate their beliefs is assumed to be 5 years (T = 5))10. We thus basically ask what is
the eﬀect of the past 5 years of incidents, on US imports.
Further, ITERATE delivers information on the country of location of each incident. This enables
us to split terrorism incidents njt between those perpetrated in the country of origin (Origjt hereafter),
those located in the targeted country (i.e. in our case, the US) and those located in third countries
(Thirdjt). In particular, we expect observations on past incidents in third countries to be the most
exogenous to US security at the borders. The reason is that terrorism in third countries should be
in return much less aﬀected by trade between the US and the origin country. In contrast, terrorism
located in either the US or the origin country could be related directly or indirectly to trade between
them. For instance, higher ﬂows from an origin country to the US could reduce security measures
at US borders for reasons discussed earlier, thus increasing the probability of incidents to take place
inside the US. Besides, an escalation to war between a given state and the US can reduce bilateral
trade but might also independently increase terrorism activities inside the former. In either of these
cases, the parameter on frequency of past incidents would be biased.
This leaves third country incidents much better candidates of exogenous security than all other
incidents. Thus we deﬁne an alternative indicator of exogenous security based solely on third inci-





, be the frequency of past incidents perpetrated in third
countries, we thus deﬁne
πUS
jt (Third) = Fjt(Third).FUS
t
to be an alternative proxy of exogenous security at the US borders. Because they are the most
closely linked to our theory, this variable, together with πUS
jt will be our main two variables of interest
in the next sections.
The dependent variable we study is bilateral US imports. We have chosen to work with data at the
product level in order to control for the relative specialization of countries which we already suspect
(see section 2) to be correlated with both measures, bilateral trade and terrorism activities. As well,
a product level analysis allows us to investigate the diﬀerential eﬀects of transnational terrorism and
10We have also considered time horizons of 3, 7 and 10 years. The results qualitatively very similar to a 5 years
horizon. They are available upon request
15bilateral security measures across sectors. Something that has been so far overlooked in other analyses
of the eﬀects of transnational terrorism on bilateral trade ﬂows.
We extract 1968-2000 bilateral imports of the United States at the product level (SITC4/5 digits)
from the NBER World Trade Data complied by Feenstra and Lipsey. The data however, provides
only values of ﬂows that exceed 100,000$ per year. This constitutes a potential problem as most
origin countries of terrorism are LDCs that export little of many products and too much of a very
few set of others where they are really specialized. Thus, neglecting small amounts could result in
an over-representation of products of specialization in the dataset, possibly less sensitive to terrorism
attacks. This could end up underestimating the impact of terrorism activities on trade. To deal
with this problem, we completed the NBER dataset with the FLUBIL trade dataset from the French
National Institute (INSEE), reporting ﬂows over 1,000$. FLUBIL is basically an updated version of
the OECD dataset on bilateral trade ﬂows where some aggregation check-ups and minor corrections
have been undertaken. It also completes the NBER dataset as it runs until 2002.
The sources of the rest of the variables that are used (i.e. traditional gravity and control variables),
are listed in the appendix of the paper.
5 Econometric Results
We want to study a bilateral US imports relation based on the trade equation (1) or its developed
version equation (2), where exogenous security measures directly aﬀect transaction costs. Let trans-
action costs be expressed as: Tj = Distj. Sβj.e(
P
v ηv.dvj). Thus, trade costs depend on geographical
distance between j exporter and the US border, a set of dummy variables (dv) designating common
language and contiguity with the US, and ﬁnally security measures at the US borders. Let further
b S = S(Zk), represent a variable of exogenous security depending on a set of K alternative variables
Zk, each representing a measure of past incidents frequency.
By approaching labor by the GDP of the importer, the productivity term a by GDP per capita
and the number of varieties by GDP of the exporter in equation (2), taking logs and indexing by time
(t), the relation to estimate for each good (g) that enter the US market becomes:
log(m
g
jt) = log(USGDPt) + log(GDPjt) + log(GDPcapjt) + (1 − σ)log(Distj)







t ) + αg + αt + u
g
jt (10)
where αg and αt are good and time ﬁxed eﬀects, u
g
jt is the residual. The β0
k are expected to be
negative: an increase in past incident shares, increases current security measures (to prevent from
potential future incidents), which leads to a decrease in US imports. The US GDP has been removed
from the equation as its variation is fully captured by the time ﬁxed eﬀect. Also, as we do not observe
the price index P, it is not a strong assumption to assume that it is captured by the time and product
16ﬁxed eﬀects.
We have alternatively run within-form equations where each import value of a given product from







j.), where the overline designates the mean over the period. This alternative equation
has the advantage to implicitly although fully account for country ﬁxed eﬀects, along with (coun-
try*product) speciﬁc eﬀects, that capture the degree of specialization of the country in a given prod-
uct. Also, by accounting for ﬁxed eﬀects, these within regressions enable to account implicitly for
sanctions taken against particular countries like Cuba or Lybia over the period. However, it has the
shortcoming to wipe out all time-constant variables. As most of our gravity (distance, contiguity,
common language) and other control variables (see below) do not change overtime, we prefer showing
mainly the pooled ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. The main within regression results are also shown in the
following tables.
All gravity and other control variables in the equation are listed and described in the appendix.
The β0
k are semi-elasticities as they are coeﬃcients on frequencies (not in logs)11. At each time we
ﬁnd it necessary, we then convert those coeﬃcients into elasticities at median points. It is important
to detail however the computation of elasticities when we introduce our main (interaction) variables π
that proxy security. As noticed the π indicator is a product of two frequencies. Its related coeﬃcient,
say β0
π, represents the semi-elasticity of US imports to the exogenous security indicator and is quite
hard to interpret in simple economic terms. A further simple manipulation, however, enables a much
better interpretation of the results.
Notice that πUS
jt varies with both, past incidents share against the US and past incidents share
that originate from j (i.e.πUS
jt = FUSt.Fj,t). Yet, one can observe from appendix 2 that most of the
variation in the data comes from the second term. In fact, the ﬁrst term, FUSt, varies relatively little
: one fourth to one half of the total listed incidents in the world hit the United states across the whole
period. Thus, for a better interpretation of the results one can simply ﬁx FUSt to equal its average





Needless then to say that because of the skewness of the Fj,t distribution (only a small fraction of
origin countries account for most of the incidents), only some few export countries to the US should
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the incidents. As a matter of fact, the median frequency of incidents
perpetrated by an origin country is 1 per thousand and only 1% of the countries are at the origin
of more than 5% of world’s total incidents over the period (see Appendix 2). Then, for those risky
countries, Fj,t is relatively high and thus the corresponding import elasticity ηm is expected to be
signiﬁcant.
11Needless to note that one main reason why we use frequencies in absolute values not in logs is that because around
50% of the frequencies of incidents have 0 values, see appendix 2
17Table 4 presents a ﬁrst set of results. Notice ﬁrst, that in all the regressions presented the usual
variables in the trade literature (GDP, distance, contiguity, common language) appear with the ex-
pected signs and magnitudes12. The GDP per capita variable appears insigniﬁcant however, partly
because it might not be a good proxy for productivity at the product level13.
Second, before including our preferred variable of counter-terrorism measures (πUS
j ), we begin
our empirical investigation by including a terrorism variable computed at the bilateral level. That





n . It is somewhat the outcome of the interactive behavior of both terrorists and US
authorities. This variable however, has a serious shortcoming. As it is deﬁned at the bilateral level it
is likely to be endogenous to bilateral trade for reasons detailed already in the stylized facts and theory
sections. The eﬀect of bilateral incidents appears however, to be negative on bilateral US imports
and statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, with a semi elasticity of 4.3. The induced elasticity computed at
the median point is thus around 0.004, an extremely low ﬁgure. But because we suspect endogeneity
between bilateral trade and bilateral incidents, we deﬁne an alternative variable where the bilateral
frequency is computed over the past 5 years of observations. Column 2 shows then that the eﬀect
of terrorism incidents increases by more than 70% although it does not gain much in signiﬁcance.
In column 3, we show results where we have split those incidents into three categories with respect
to their location: those perpetrated against and within the US, those targeting US interests in the
origin country of the terrorists and ﬁnally, those targeting the US in third countries. It appears that
incidents perpetrated within the US, together with incidents in the home country, do not seem to
aﬀect signiﬁcantly US bilateral imports. By a sharp contrast however, incidents perpetrated in third
countries appear to aﬀect negatively and very signiﬁcantly (1%) exports of origin countries to the
United States. Now, if computed at median levels, the elasticity is null because the median frequency
of incidents perpetrated in third countries is null. But if one believes that the obtained 180 semi-
elasticity is representative of the true eﬀect of incidents, perpetrated in whichever location, then the
resulting elasticity of incidents at the median point is around 0.18 (i.e: a 1% increase in incidents
against the US results in a reduction of their imports of around 0.18%).14
12The impact of distance is around 2 times smaller than in the rest of the literature but this is due to the nature of
the panel where only the US is the importer. In fact, as we are accounting for contiguity in our regression, the distance
variable looses most of its variability as all potential exporters are now at relatively comparable distances from the US.
13We have also run the same type of equations at the aggregate level where we do ﬁnd a robust positive eﬀect of GDP
per capita. Regressions can be provided upon request.
14Our premise is that US authorities are imposing counter terrorist security measures against origin countries of
terrorism. In our theory, this provides a channel through which bilateral US import volumes might aﬀect endogenously
(and positively) terrorists activities. Another ”security channel” though could alternatively come from security measures
implemented by ”source” countries’ governments. Indeed, if an origin country of terrorism sends large export volumes
to the US, then its government may have a larger economic incentives to prevent terrorism against the US. It thus
implements counter terrorist and security policies aimed at reducing terrorist attacks against the US interests, on its
own territory. One would expect therefore a negative relationship between the volume of US bilateral imports from that
”origin country” and the frequency of terrorist incidents against the US in that country. At the same time though, a
terrorist organization of the ”origin country” would ﬁnd it relatively easier to hit US interests in a third country (i.e. a
location substitution eﬀect). Therefore, by the same token, one would also obtain a positive relationship between the
18Our theoretical set-up mentions that one good way to capture the eﬃciency of terrorist organiza-
tions that are targeting not only the US but all other countries. Also, another good way to capture
the eﬃciency of US authorities is to consider not only perpetrators from one given country j but
perpetrators from all countries together. We thus introduce together into the equation the frequency
of incidents originating from a country j (against all targets) and the frequency of incidents against
the US (from all countries of origin) as an alternative to the bilateral frequency of incidents variable.
Columns 4 and 5 report the results for those variables computed respectively to express current and
last 5 years of observations. In magnitude terms, the eﬀects seem to be comparable to those reported
earlier in columns 1 and 2. What is important to notice though is that the eﬀects are now much more
statistically signiﬁcant (1%).
Finally, our theory mentions that the interaction of terrorist and US authorities eﬃciencies should
reveal even better the impact on security and thereby trade. We thus introduce to the equation the
interaction variable π, as an alternative security proxy. Namely, this is the product of the share of
incidents introduced separately in the latter two regressions. Column 6 shows that the corresponding
coeﬃcient is negative and statistically very signiﬁcant. The inferred elasticity ηm computed at the
median point (1 per thousand of incidents originating from half of the countries) is around 0.0055: this
is to say that for half of the export countries in the sample, a doubling of the frequency of incidents
appears to be reducing US imports only by 0.55%. Now, although very small on average, that impact
could be much more signiﬁcant for origin countries at the top of the distribution of incidents. Thus,
Colombia, a country associated with more than 20% of incidents against the US in some years can
then be highly aﬀected as the corresponding elasticity of US imports to past incidents that originate
from these countries is respectively around 1 and 1.25.
In column 7, we split our interaction variable between incidents perpetrated in own country and
incidents perpetrated outside the country. Despite a non signiﬁcant impact regarding incidents in own
country, we obtain a very signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect of incidents located in a diﬀerent country.
Notice here that the third country estimator is around 5 times higher than all-incidents estimator
shown in column 6.
Table 5 keeps on using the third country based proxy for exogenous security while introducing
progressively all possible controls (column 1 is the benchmark, identical to column 7 in the prior
table). As a matter of fact, in order to have a better estimate of the magnitude of the terrorism eﬀect,
one needs to control for many other sources that could co-vary independently with terrorism acts on
one hand and trade ﬂows on the other. We begin by introducing a set of controls directly related to
cross-border security between the US and their partners. In column 2 of table 6 , we include a dummy
revealing an occurrence of a Militarized Interstate Dispute between a given country and the US, lagged
volume of US imports from the ”origin country” and the frequency of terrorist incidents in a third country. As incidents
perpetrated in third countries appear to aﬀect negatively and very signiﬁcantly exports of origin countries to the United
States, this suggest that such an alternative ”security channel” is not empirically important.
As is seen later in section 6.3,, a direct measure of security policies (business visas) of the target country (the US)
againsts entry of residents from ”terrorist origin countries” is also consistent with our.view.
19over 10 years of observations as in Glick and Taylor (2005) and Martin, Mayer et Thoenig (2005). The
data comes from the Correlates of War project. The sign of the coeﬃcients is negative but not always
statistically signiﬁcant, possibly because we are working on a diﬀerent panel at the product level. In
the next tables we’ll see that the impact of war diﬀers across types of products. The inclusion of this
measure of cross-border security however, reduces only slightly the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on
past terrorism incidents.
Second, there are also some reasons to believe that two countries sharing the same types of political
and economic institutions on the one hand could also share lower transaction costs and thus make
more trade. On the other hand, this institutional proximity could lower the occurrence of terrorism
attacks between them. In order to control for this eﬀect, we add a dummy variable constructed from
PolityIV dataset that takes on 1 when the polity variable (a grade that measures the degree of good
governance) is as high as that of the US15, and 0 otherwise. But the eﬀect, although positive, does
not appear to be signiﬁcant and leaves the variable of terrorism incidents unaﬀected.
We next introduce a series of controls related to insecurity that originate speciﬁcally from the
exporting country. The objective, here again, is to isolate all the forces that aﬀect both bilateral trade
and terrorism incidents. The progressive inclusion of a civil war dummy, a newstate exporter dummy,
a proxy of good governance (i.e. polity2 variable in PolityIV, varying from -10 to 10), measures of
ethnic or religion fractions (from Alesina et al (2003) dataset), reduce further by a third the magnitude
of the coeﬃcient on past frequencies of incidents, although without aﬀecting its high signiﬁcance in
the pooled regression (i.e. estimators reduced from 80 to 57).16. Column 9 introduces almost all of the
control variables together17 and shows further that the impact of third countries incidents variable is
still signiﬁcant with a semi-elasticity that reaches 47. Finally, as mentioned earlier, we run a within
type regression that accounts for (country*product) dyadic eﬀects in order to account for country
specialization. The eﬀect of the terrorism variable based on third countries, appear again with the a
magnitude similar to that obtained from the prior regression, if one accounts for standard errors. To
sum up, if the true semi-elasticity is say around 40, the inferred elasticity ηm computed at the median
point (1 per thousand of incidents originating from half of the countries) is around 0.015. This is
still not a high ﬁgure. However, those exporting countries which happen to be at the origin of high
terrorism activities over the period like Colombia (more than 20% share of total incidents in some
years), tend to be associated with an elasticity of at least 2.8, almost three times as much as that
estimated earlier.
15The US grade is 10, the maximum that could be obtained by a ranked country
16Notice however, that most of these variables appear to be statistically insigniﬁcant. Religion Fractions in a exporting
country seems however to be good for trade with the US. This result is consistent with Alesina et al (2003) ﬁndings
concerning the role of this variable on various outcomes.
17To avoid multicollinearity, we have removed Ethnic fractions and newstate exporter dummy from the regression
206 Terrorism to Reveal Security
Although we introduced many controls, we still need to show further that what we are picking is
really a speciﬁc terrorism eﬀect. Besides, we lack variables describing directly security measures.
Thus, although consistent with our story, we could not prove so far empirically that the relationship
between terrorism incidents and trade is really due to those measures. This section tries to go further
into investigating the relationship between trade and terrorism through the security channel.
6.1 The impact of human victims
In order to see ﬁrst whether we are really capturing a speciﬁc terrorism eﬀect, we interact the variable
of past incidents shares with the average number of human victims per incident perpetrated by the
terrorists of a given country j. Only incidents in third countries are considered here, as we know from
the previous section that they seem to pick up most of the exogenous eﬀect of terrorism on security
and trade.We expect those incidents with high number of victims to aﬀect even more current security
measures and thus bilateral US imports.
Table 6, column 1, shows the results for the complete speciﬁcation. We deﬁne incidents as being
relatively harmful in terms of casualties when they result in a number of human victims (deaths and
injuries) higher than the standard deviation from the average in the sample. The average number of
victims in the sample is around 3 by incident while the deviation is around 10. Then, we construct
a dummy that takes value 1 when the resulting number of victims passes 13 (i.e. higher than the
average+std) and 0 otherwise. The interaction term in column 1 (table 6) is negative but statistically
insigniﬁcant. The impact of victims becomes statistically signiﬁcant when their number becomes
higher than 5 standard deviations (i.e. more than 50 victims). Column 2 shows indeed that the
negative eﬀect on US imports is up to three times higher when the incident is very harmful.
The number of victims variable is a speciﬁc feature of terrorism and hence is completely consistent
with the view that we are really picking up the impact of terrorism on trade. However, we still do
not know whether this impact is truly coming from high security measures at the borders or whether
it is due to higher insurance costs, or a boycott eﬀect from the US consumers. We develop in what
follows a strategy that could help us identify better the security eﬀect.
6.2 Discussing further the security eﬀect hypothesis
By taking advantage from trade observed at the bilateral and product level, we take three further
routes to analyze whether or not the impact of terrorist incidents are informing on security measures
taken at the border.
First, recalling our theory, we expect small partners of the US to be much more aﬀected from
terrorism than its big partners. The reason is that American citizens’ welfare should be more depen-
dent on big trading partners which then incite US authorities to limit their security measures towards
the latter. In that respect, higher terrorism activities in the past might be more harmful to small
21partners, but less harmful to big partners. Table 6, column 3, shows indeed that when the GDP of
the partner increases the eﬀect of terrorism incidents that originate from the latter decreases on US
imports 18. This size eﬀect does not alter however that of the high-number of victims. This suggest
then that the country size eﬀect does matter but for incidents that do not result in a high number of
victims.
Second, if terrorism increases security controls at the borders then we expect terrorism acts to
result in higher time spent at the borders. Thus, time-sensitive products should be much more
aﬀected by terrorism than time-insensitive ones. We take advantage from a study by Hummels (2002)
where he estimates the average sensitivity of days spent in transport on trade at the SITC2 product
level. We classify those products where time-sensitivity of trade is higher than -0.01 (and statistically
signiﬁcant) into a time-sensitive product category and the rest, usually around 0.005, into a time-
insensitive categorie19. Table 6 again, shows that indeed time-sensitive products are more sensitive
to terrorism acts than the rest. They are even more than 4 times more sensitive when the number of
victims per incident is very high.
Third, we expect that terrorism against the US aﬀects networks formation between the latter and
the country of origin, if terrorism results in lower issuing visas and higher visa controls at the borders.
Thus, if security at the border matters, we expect products that ask for networks and where market
information is costly (i.e. needs more labor mobility) to be more sensitive to terrorism acts in the
past than those products negotiated on global markets where information on prices and quantities
is readily available. We thus split the sample by three sets of products classiﬁed by Rauch (1996)
into products in organized exchange, referenced prices products and diﬀerentiated products. Table 6
shows the result for the three subsamples: In the case of organized exchange products, the impact of
incidents is insigniﬁcant even when they result in a high number of victims. In the case of referenced
price products, the impact is as high as for diﬀerentiated products (semi elasticity around 52). In the
latter case however, when those acts result in a high number of victims, the interaction term shows
that the sensitivity to terrorism acts is 5 times higher.
This last result is interesting to discuss in the perspective of the alternative boycott explanation
of the eﬀect of terrorism on bilateral trade ﬂows. If indeed, a change in US consumers’ preferences
is the explanation of the negative impact on US imports of terrorist incidents emanating from origin
countries, then we should expect this boycott eﬀect to be stronger on standard and referenced goods
than on diﬀerentiated products, as the ﬁrst can be more easily substituted towards alternative supply
sources. The fact that the impact of terrorist incidents on diﬀerentiated products is stronger than on
standard products, suggests on the contrary that a change in US consumers preferences is unlikely to
be an important explanation of the negative impact of transnational terrorism on US bilateral trade
ﬂows The following section goes further in conﬁrming that the security channel is more empirically
18We also ﬁnd the same qualitative result when we interact the third incidents variable with a dummy that takes on
1 when the size of the country in terms of GDP is higher than the median size country.
19Standard error of the estimates were not provided. Hence, we could not compare statistically the level of estimators
with each others. That is why we have chosen the threshold method where 0.01 seemed to be a clear cut between
insensitive and sensitive-time products.
22consistent with the data.
6.3 Terrorism, Visas and US Imports
Here, we pursue our investigations by running a series of regressions where we could employ a true
variable of bilateral security at the borders but on a much smaller period. We thus assemble data on
the number of non-immigrant visa issuances by partner country from 1997 to 2002 (last year of our US
imports dataset). These data are provided online by the US Department of State20. We have chosen
to work on the number of visas issued for Business (B1) and Business and Leisure (B1-2), assuming
that those who come for both Business and Leisure decide to do so primarily for business activities21.
Now, the rate of visas issued (i.e. ratio of number of visas to total visas demand) would have
been even a better proxy for security, as it informs on the number of visa denied as well by the
United States. However, and probably for political reasons, we could not ﬁnd this information on the
Department of State website.
We want to investigate whether the impact of terrorism incidents on trade in diﬀerentiated
(network-related) products is truly transiting through the number of issued visas for Business. Hence,
on one side we study the relationship between terrorism incidents and the number of visas issued (this
is to be called our empirical model 1, hereafter) and on the other side, we study the link between the
visas and trade in diﬀerentiated products (model 2, hereafter). Model 1 will also serve as a ﬁrst stage
regression when we run an instrumental variable regression of US imports later on.
Table 7 presents the results. The ﬁrst two columns present two alternative econometric methods
(Product/year ﬁxed eﬀects and Within) to explain the business visas issued, using mainly gravity type
determinants. We add further both types of terrorism incidents based on origin and third countries. As
for US imports, third countries incidents variable appear to aﬀect signiﬁcantly business visa issuance.
However, no evidence is provided for incidents perpetrated on the origin country soil.
In return, Columns 3 to 5 investigate the impact of business visas on US imports. We expect the
eﬀect to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant for diﬀerentiated products, and no eﬀect for organized
exchange products. Column 5 conﬁrms the ﬁrst intuition: namely a 10% increase in visa issuing
increases by almost 5% trade with US in diﬀerentiated products. However, the eﬀect of business visas
appears to be negatively aﬀecting trade in organized exchange but this eﬀect is not robust across
speciﬁcations22.
Finally, we have also run an instrumental variable regression in model 2 where the number of
business visas is instrumented by all variables described in model 1. The chi-squared Anderson
statistic presented rejects the exogeneity hypothesis of the number of visas and the instruments pass
the over-identiﬁcation test. The eﬀect appears now to be higher (more positive) whichever the class of
20http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics 1476.html
21Only citizens of countries that are not part of the Visa Waiver Program are included in our analysis. Hence, most
of the OECD countries, part of this program, are not included in the panel because their nationals do not need visas in
general to enter the US for Business or Leisure for a short stay (under 3 months).
22Results upon request
23products. In particular, and as expected, the impact of the number of visas on US imports of network
related products is now 25% higher than in the ﬁxed eﬀects regression presented earlier, the impact
on imports of referenced prices goods becomes now slightly positive and statistically signiﬁcant and
the eﬀect on organized exchange goods appears to be insigniﬁcant.
We have also considered other alternative types of instruments such a series of frequency of inci-
dents in third countries lagged over several years (generally up till 6 years) and bilateral type incidents
in third countries (incidents targeting directly the US, but perpetrated in third countries) lagged also
over several years. The results remain unchanged. They are not presented here to save space23.
From the IV regression above one can then easily compute the impact of incidents on us imports
via the number of delivered visas. The elasticity at the median point would be the product of the
elasticity of trade to visas and that of visas to incidents shares: η = (0.69)∗(80∗0.001∗0.35) ≈ 0.019.
This is comparable to the early ﬁgures in the prior sections where the number of visas was not yet
introduced into the study.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have asked what is the impact of security, to prevent terrorism, on bilateral trade.
To this end we have set up a theory which shows that the impact goes not only from terrorism to
trade. Trade might, in turn, increase the probability of terrorism acts.
Our theory however, allows for a strategy to condition out the latter, in order to identify the
true impact of terrorism. We have shown in particular, how past incidents located in third countries
(anywhere in the world except the origin or the target country) can constitute good instruments of
current security measures at the borders of the latter.
We have run our tests on US imports. We have shown that past terrorist acts, perpetrated by
groups from a given country against the US, aﬀect its exports to the latter. The level of the impact
is multiplied by three when the acts result in a relatively ’high’ number of victims (ie. higher than a
standard deviation from the mean number of victims over the period). To ﬁx ideas, a 1% increase in
the frequency of terrorism acts originating from a high-terrorism origin country, say Colombia, against
the US, reduces imports from Colombia by 3%. This eﬀect reaches a striking 10% decrease in US
imports when terrorism attacks have important victim consequences. But this high ﬁgure is rather an
exception. Only 1 percent of the countries (i.e. the most risky ones) are associated with signiﬁcant
eﬀects on their exports to the US. For an extreme majority of cases, the elasticity of US imports is
very much lower.
Further, we expect that security measures at the borders are time costly and thus should aﬀect
more time-sensitive products (foreign newspapers, live animals, fresh fruits, etc...). We also know that
they could aﬀect international networks and business through limiting the movements of businessmen
and the issuing of visas. Thus, products that are sensitive to these features could be also more aﬀected
23They can be asked for upon request
24by higher security to prevent terrorism. Our results appear to be perfectly consistent with these two
views. We have found that the negative impact of terrorism is two to three times higher for products
that have these characteristics. Further, using an additional dataset from the department on state on
visa issuance from 1997 to 2002, we have shown how terrorism aﬀects the number of business visas
delivered by the US, thereby impacting signiﬁcantly bilateral exports in diﬀerentiated products. All
these results suggest that security to prevent terrorism does matter for US imports.
What can we conclude from these results? As long as US imports come mainly from countries
that do not represent a high risk in terms of terrorism acts, the US consumers should not be too much
aﬀected by security measures at the borders. However, those few countries at the origin of most of
the attacks towards the US could be highly aﬀected, especially those countries for which the US often
constitutes a signiﬁcant market for their export products. Hence, the protection of US lives might be
undertaken at the expense of some foreign less developed countries’ economies.
Our results are consistent with the role played by security measures at the borders. It should be
noted however that other elements might as well aﬀect the nexus between trade and transnational
terrorism. For instance, changes in the behaviors of insurers (higher rates of insurance prices) or
changes in consumer choices (discrimination and embargo) could also aﬀect trade and consequently
terrorist attacks.
Besides, we assign in this paper each terrorist attack to one particular origin. We know however
that this is only partly true in today’s changing forms of terrorism where terrorist organizations are
increasingly becoming more multinational. Put diﬀerently, this paper does not study the indirect
impact of terrorism from one country of origin on security measures over other suspected countries,
which for instance might host groups from the same ’multinational’ organization. One might argue
that the indirect impact can be substantial as well. All these issues that arise naturally from our
work, deserve to be speciﬁcally investigated in future research.
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27Appendix 1: Existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium security vector S = (S∗
1,....S∗
N)
in the multi-country terrorist case:
Transactions costs between countries 0 and j take the exponential form:
T0j(S) = Tj eβSj with β > 0
Let us denote the following Assumption :








for all j ∈ [1,K]
Then we have the following result :
• Under assumption A, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the security-terrorism
game between country 0 and the K terrorist organizations. It is characterized by an equilib-
rium security vector S = (S∗
1,....S∗
































































for all j ∈ [1,K]
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βVj it generates a unique solution Sj(A). As a matter of
fact, the function





























> 0. By the theorem
of intermediate values there is at least one value Sj(A) which is such that Ψ(Sj(A)) = 0. The value





2, one has Ψ0(S) > 0. As a matter
of fact










































































































29Hence there can only a unique solution of Ψ(Sj(A)) = 0. The situation is depicted by a picture





























Now we get the equilibrium value of A from the following equation:




Φ(A) is decreasing in A (recall that Sh(A) is increasing in A and σ > 1). In A = 0, it has a positive
value and it remains bounded when A goes to inﬁnity, From this Φ(A)−A is strictly decreasing with
value Φ(0) > 0 at 0 and value −∞ for A tending to ∞. Hence there is a unique A∗ satisfying
A = Φ(A).
Once we know A∗, we can recover the equilibrium security vector S∗ = [Sj(A∗)]j∈[1,K], the corre-
sponding equilibrium eﬀorts of terrorism of each group RL∗
j = R(Sj(A∗,θL)) and RH∗
j = R(Sj(A∗,θH))
and the probability of non occurrence of a terrorist act in country as







































30Appendix 2: Bayesian revision of beliefs after past terrorism in a third country.
We provide here a simple justiﬁcation of why beliefs of the government can be correlated to past
terrorist actions in third countries. Consider the following timing. At the beginning of the period, a
terrorist organization k tries to hit citizen or economic interests of country 0 in the rest of the world
























is the probability of success of a terrorist act in country j committed by orga-
















which depends positively on the amount of resources R
j
k invested by the terrorist organization and
negatively on some speciﬁc factor S
j
k to country j (security measures, environment, political stability
links between countries k and j, etc...). θk is the marginal resource cost of the terrorist organization
and V
j
k is the perceived visibility gain that is enjoyed by the terrorist organization when the terrorist
act is successful in country j against country 0.
The solution of (3) gives immediately: the reaction curve of terrorist group k in country j
R
j









and the frequency of terrorist acts by organization k in country j against country 0 is
π
j








31as θk can only take two values θL and θH with θL < θH, let us denote νL
0k and νH
0k = 1 − νL
0k





k is iid distributed across countries and follows a density law f(.)
Then applying Bayes’ law gives us the revised belief of the government of country 0 after having
observed π
j



































































































It is easy to see immediately that νL
1k is an increasing function of π
j
k (the probability of success of


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UNO* 1 4002 1357 1 1352 1 1051 1 242 1 -38,18%
PAL 2 823 409 2 240 2 138 3 36 4 -69,49%
COL 3 457 36 12 120 7 146 2 155 2 1392,53%
TUR 4 292 46 10 169 4 63 10 14 15 5,50%
IRN 5 275 16 27 162 5 90 5 7 22 51,66%
LBN 6 236 21 20 178 3 34 17 3 40 -50,48%
CUB 7 220 161 3 45 19 10 42 4 30 -91,39%
ESP 8 207 31 15 122 6 49 13 5 26 -44,09%
GRC 9 207 36 12 85 10 71 9 15 13 44,44%
PHL 10 206 20 23 89 9 80 7 17 12 194,65%
GBR 11 169 63 7 64 14 34 17 8 19 -55,98%
PER 12 164 7 38 78 12 75 8 4 30 98,09%
USA 13 162 77 6 72 13 11 38 2 45 -91,00%
ARG 14 160 137 4 13 36 9 46 1 55 -97,47%
PRI 15 153 91 5 62 15 0 0 -100,00%
KUR 16 131 27 27 104 4 0 0,00%
FRA 17 130 53 8 60 16 10 42 7 22 -54,22%
RFA 18 126 33 14 91 8 2 76 -100,00%
SLV 19 119 14 29 79 11 26 20 -100,00%
ITA 20 110 52 9 40 20 8 51 10 17 -33,34%
SOM 21 95 1 65 1 81 85 6 8 19 2673,21%
IRQ 22 86 8 35 36 23 23 21 19 9 723,30%
DZA 23 83 8 35 3 68 57 11 15 13 549,97%
KOR 24 83 46 18 37 16 0,00%
GTM 25 80 21 20 40 20 19 25 -100,00%
YUG 26 77 37 11 23 28 12 34 5 26 -53,16%
PAK 27 75 5 42 12 40 18 26 40 3 2673,21%
JPN 28 69 22 19 32 24 14 30 1 55 -84,24%
IND 29 66 17 25 22 29 21 23 6 24 22,35%
LBY 30 65 1 65 56 17 8 51 -100,00%
EGY 31 63 2 57 13 36 42 14 6 24 939,96%
CHL 32 59 4 47 16 34 38 15 1 55 -13,34%
IDN 33 57 15 28 4 62 4 64 34 5 685,74%
KHM 34 54 1 65 2 71 51 12 -100,00%
YEM 35 52 1 81 27 19 24 6
AGO 36 45 3 51 10 41 9 46 23 8 2557,66%
PRT 37 45 5 42 38 22 1 89 1 55 -30,67%
HND 38 44 30 25 14 30 0,00%
NIC 39 41 13 31 18 31 9 46 1 55 -73,33%
ISR 40 40 18 24 13 36 8 51 1 55 -80,74%
JOR 41 40 5 42 22 29 9 46 4 30 177,32%
MEX 42 40 28 16 8 45 2 76 2 45 -75,24%
BOL 43 38 21 20 7 48 10 42 -100,00%
MOZ 44 36 28 26 8 51
RUS 45 34 17 33 16 28 1 55
SLE 46 34 10 42 24 6
ETH 47 33 11 33 10 41 11 38 1 55 -68,49%
SAU 48 33 1 65 1 81 12 34 19 9 6486,38%
LKA 49 32 1 65 6 50 21 23 4 30 1286,61%
ZWE 50 32 12 32 18 31 1 89 1 55 -71,11%
AFG 51 31 1 5 56 13 32 13 16 801,29%
ERI 52 27 26 17 1 81 -100,00%
URY 53 27 26 17 1 55 -86,67%
SDN 54 26 10 41 13 32 3 40
VEN 55 26 14 29 5 56 3 70 4 30 -0,96%
BIH 56 25 23 21 2 45
SYR 57 23 1 65 13 36 8 51 1 55 246,65%
NGA 58 22 1 65 1 81 2 76 18 11 6139,73%
DEU 59 20 17 27 3 40
PAN 60 20 3 51 6 50 11 38
Total 10772 3106 3887 2884 896
*UNO=Unknown Origin
** calculations are based on the relative growth between the share of incidents in the first decade (1968-1978) and that of the last 
period considered (1998-2003). When the country has not been associated with incidents in first decade, the second decade is 
taken to compute the related growth rate of incidents.  
Table 1: Rankings of Origin Countries across periods
1968-1978 1978-1988 1988-1998 1998-2003




(1968-2003) incidents rank incidents rank incidents rank incidents rank
Growth share 
of incidents**
USA 1 3822 1385 1 1125 1 854 1 458 1 14,60%
FRA 2 649 75 6 368 2 180 2 26 4 20,13%
ISR 3 647 385 2 140 5 98 7 24 5 -78,40%
GBR 4 581 120 3 216 3 170 3 75 2 116,59%
TUR 5 310 32 15 126 6 146 4 6 20 -35,02%
RUS 6 276 65 7 86 9 115 6 10 12 -46,69%
UNO* 7 269 30 16 191 4 44 11 4 24 -53,79%
ITA 8 266 39 11 114 7 93 8 20 6 77,71%
INT* 9 253 19 20 51 15 133 5 50 3 811,95%
RFA 10 212 117 4 95 8 -100,00%
ESP 11 218 82 5 62 10 62 9 12 10 -49,29%
PAL 12 130 51 9 59 12 20 23 -100,00%
JPN 13 123 18 24 46 16 56 10 3 29 -42,24%
IND 14 119 34 14 37 19 34 13 14 9 42,69%
CHE 15 107 20 19 56 14 22 20 9 14 55,94%
IRN 16 106 17 26 60 11 29 14 -100,00%
NLD 17 98 35 13 32 23 20 23 11 11 8,91%
YUG 18 97 48 10 37 19 10 45 2 34 -85,56%
CUB 19 96 56 8 24 29 11 41 5 22 -69,06%
UFN 20 91 29 17 19 36 27 15 16 7 91,19%
VEN 21 91 14 28 31 25 40 12 6 20 48,52%
BEL 22 79 10 34 32 23 22 20 15 8 419,81%
EGY 23 72 23 18 31 25 18 26 -100,00%
CAN 24 71 13 31 21 34 27 15 10 12 166,57%
IRQ 25 70 14 28 43 17 12 38 1 49 -75,25%
IRL 26 68 36 12 18 38 11 41 3 29 -71,12%
LBY 27 63 59 12 4 75
PRT 28 58 8 40 36 21 10 45 4 24 73,27%
NIC 29 57 11 32 33 22 13 37 -100,00%
CHL 30 55 19 20 26 28 10 45 -100,00%
SWE 31 55 11 32 23 31 18 26 3 29 -5,49%
AUT 32 50 10 34 21 34 18 26 1 49 -65,35%
COL 33 50 14 28 16 42 12 38 8 16 98,02%
MEX 34 50 18 24 16 42 14 34 2 34 -61,50%
SAU 35 50 2 60 24 29 23 19 1 49 73,27%
KWT 36 49 4 53 38 18 7 56 -100,00%
ZAF 37 49 9 38 22 33 14 34 4 24 54,02%
GRC 38 43 7 43 16 42 18 26 2 34 -0,99%
AUS 39 42 2 60 15 45 17 30 8 16 1286,16%
SYR 40 41 10 34 27 27 4 75 -100,00%
CHN 41 40 12 50 26 17 2 34
JOR 42 39 8 40 17 40 10 45 4 24 73,27%
ARG 43 36 15 27 14 47 5 67 2 34 -53,79%
BRA 44 34 6 45 9 54 19 25 -100,00%
LBN 45 34 19 20 11 53 4 75 -100,00%
NAT 46 33 23 31 8 52 2 34
PHL 47 32 1 78 9 54 14 34 8 16 2672,32%
POL 48 32 5 48 8 58 15 33 4 24 177,23%
CYP 49 31 2 60 19 36 10 45 -100,00%
KOR 50 30 2 60 9 54 17 30 2 34 246,54%
Total 10772 3105 3887 2884 896
* INT=International Organizations; UNO=Unknown Targeted country
**Calculations are based on the relative growth between the share of incidents in the first decade (1968-1978) and that of the last 
period considered (1998-2003). When the country has not been associated with incidents in first decade, the second decade is taken to 
compute the related growth rate of incidents.  
Table 2: Rankings of Targeted Countries across periods
1968-1978 1978-1988 1988-1998 1998-2003
361968-2003
Origin Target  Rank Total incidents incidents rank incidents rank incidents rank incidents rank
Groth share of 
incidents**
UNO USA 1 1591 774 1 392 1 298 1 127 1 -43,14%
PAL ISR 2 317 240 2 46 12 25 20 6 19 -91,34%
COL USA 3 232 13 35 45 13 54 7 120 2 3098,83%
UNO FRA 4 212 19 21 128 2 60 4 5 22 -8,81%
UNO ISR 5 192 103 3 51 8 36 10 2 60 -93,27%
UNO GBR 6 176 32 11 62 5 58 5 24 4 159,91%
PAL USA 7 175 71 6 38 18 48 9 18 6 -12,14%
PRI USA 8 142 87 5 55 7 -100,00%
PHL USA 9 120 13 35 40 16 57 6 10 9 166,57%
UNO INT 10 119 7 62 23 30 65 3 24 4 1088,14%
TUR TUR 11 105 17 25 71 3 16 29 1 114 -79,62%
UNO RUS 12 103 17 25 32 22 52 8 2 60 -59,23%
ARG USA 13 101 91 4 4 160 5 97 1 114 -96,19%
GRC USA 14 100 31 12 38 18 22 22 9 10 0,61%
ESP FRA 15 97 8 56 66 4 21 23 2 60 -13,36%
UNO ESP 16 90 50 7 26 26 10 45 4 28 -72,28%
KUR TUR 17 87 10 76 77 2
GBR GBR 18 86 23 18 38 18 21 23 4 28 -39,73%
UNO TUR 19 78 14 32 31 23 31 12 2 60 -50,49%
PER USA 20 76 6 73 41 14 28 18 1 114 -42,24%
UNO UNO 21 76 4 96 56 6 16 29 -100,00%
KOR USA 22 74 41 14 33 11
TUR USA 23 73 19 21 19 40 29 15 6 19 9,43%
LBN USA 24 69 7 62 47 11 13 35 2 60 -0,99%
UNO ITA 25 69 12 42 24 28 29 15 4 28 15,51%
CUB USA 26 66 39 9 27 25 -100,00%
UNO RFA 27 66 40 8 23 30 3 148 -100,00%
IRN USA 28 64 12 42 38 18 11 39 3 44 -13,36%
RFA USA 29 60 12 42 48 9 -100,00%
SLV USA 30 58 2 153 40 16 16 29 -100,00%
CUB CUB 31 56 36 10 9 87 8 57 3 44 -71,12%
LBN FRA 32 56 5 81 48 9 3 148 -100,00%
COL VEN 33 49 1 219 14 50 29 15 5 22 1632,70%
UNO JPN 34 47 21 36 25 20 1 114
UNO PAL 35 46 16 27 22 34 8 57 -100,00%
UNO YUG 36 46 16 27 22 34 7 69 1 114 -78,34%
GBR IRL 37 45 30 13 10 76 5 97 -100,00%
USA RUS 38 45 29 14 16 46 -100,00%
CHL USA 39 44 2 153 11 68 30 13 1 114 73,27%
ITA USA 40 44 29 14 10 76 1 317 4 28 -52,20%
PAK USA 41 44 1 219 7 100 5 97 31 3 10642,75%
IRN IRN 42 42 3 121 24 28 15 33 -100,00%
UNO UFN 43 41 25 17 2 261 12 37 2 60 -72,28%
UNO IRN 44 40 9 52 21 36 10 45 -100,00%
ESP ESP 45 39 13 35 6 115 20 25 -100,00%
PAL PAL 46 38 16 27 18 43 4 118 -100,00%
YUG YUG 47 37 28 16 8 93 1 317 -100,00%
UNO EGY 48 36 14 32 13 55 9 52 -100,00%
UNO IND 49 36 14 32 10 76 10 45 2 60 -50,49%
PAL GBR 50 35 13 35 13 55 7 69 2 60 -46,69%
UNO CUB 51 35 18 24 13 55 2 199 2 60 -61,50%
UNO SAU 52 35 1 219 14 50 19 26 1 114 246,54%
UNO IRQ 53 34 7 62 20 38 6 79 1 114 -50,49%
SOM USA 54 33 30 13 3 44
DZA FRA 55 31 1 372 28 18 2 60
UNO NLD 56 31 6 73 13 55 6 79 6 19 246,54%
BOL USA 57 30 19 21 4 160 7 69 -100,00%
HND USA 58 30 19 40 11 39
GTM USA 59 29 8 56 17 44 4 118 -100,00%
IRN FRA 60 29 25 27 4 118
IND IND 61 28 13 35 12 65 3 148 -100,00%
LBY LBY 62 28 28 24
SAU USA 63 29 1 0 11 39 17 7 5791,18%
UNO BEL 64 28 5 81 10 76 12 37 1 114 -30,69%
FRA USA 65 27 15 30 7 100 3 148 2 60 -53,79%
Note: UNO=Unknown origin; INT=International Organizations
Table 3: Ranking of incidents by Origin and Target Countries across periods
All Period (1968-2003)
**Calculations are based on the relative growth between the share of incidents in the first decade (1968-1978) and that of the last 
period considered (1998-2003). When the country has not been associated with incidents in first decade, the second decade is taken 
to compute the related growth rate of incidents.  
1968-1978 1978-1988 1988-1998 1998-2003
37Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Constant -1.089*** -0.233*** -0.238*** 0.165 0.772*** -0.227*** -0.216***
[0.156] [0.077] [0.077] [0.179] [0.116] [0.076] [0.078]
Log GDP exporter 0.797*** 0.805*** 0.808*** 0.803*** 0.815*** 0.813*** 0.829***
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.049]
Log Weighted Distance -0.465** -0.472** -0.454* -0.485** -0.498** -0.489** -0.523**
[0.230] [0.232] [0.230] [0.231] [0.233] [0.233] [0.234]
English Common Language  0.380** 0.381** 0.373** 0.389** 0.392** 0.390** 0.437**
[0.160] [0.161] [0.162] [0.162] [0.164] [0.163] [0.174]
Contiguity 0.994** 0.999*** 1.007** 0.950** 0.936** 0.952** 0.850**
[0.384] [0.381] [0.386] [0.388] [0.388] [0.387] [0.385]
Log GDP per cap 0.02 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.006 0.009 0.002
[0.063] [0.064] [0.064] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064] [0.064]
Frequency of Incidents originating from 
i against US:
 _ in current year -4.397*
[2.616]
_during last 5 years -7.316*
[4.235]
Frequency of Incidents originating from 
i against US (during last 5 years):
_ and located in i  -3.764
[3.967]
_ and located in US -81.545
[128.673]
_ and located in third countries -180.106***
[35.838]
Frequency of Incidents originating from i
-4.470**
[1.863]
Frequency of Incidents against the US -5.495***
[0.732]
(1) : Frequency of Incidents originating 
from i (during last 5 years) -6.923**
[3.181]
(2): Frequency of Incidents against the 
US (during last 5 years) -5.938***
[0.679]
 (1) * (2): Security proxy -16.327**
[8.211]
(1) * (2) : Security proxy based on 
incidents located in i -7.139
[7.529]
(1) * (2) Security proxy , based on 
incidents located in  third countries -80.887***
[29.030]
Fixed effects:
_ product (SITC 5 digits) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
_ year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 699249 673725 673725 700297 673725 673725 673725
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Table 4: Impact of Terrorism incidents on Log of US imports
Robust Standard errors provided in brackets with clustering by exporter






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant -0.295*** -0.293*** -0.323*** -0.316 -1.041* 1.800*** 0.116 -0.576
[0.080] [0.080] [0.085] [0.353] [0.623] [0.682] [0.396] [0.628]
Log GDP exporter 0.805*** 0.804*** 0.809*** 0.736*** 0.934*** 0.276*** 0.524*** 0.868***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.030] [0.055] [0.066] [0.033] [0.055]
Log Weighted Distance -0.529** -0.530** -0.508** -0.447*** -0.625** -0.322 -0.680*** -0.611**
[0.221] [0.220] [0.218] [0.153] [0.270] [0.224] [0.133] [0.285]
English Common 
Language  0.290* 0.290* 0.265 0.323** 0.363* 0.381 0.281* 0.263
[0.172] [0.173] [0.177] [0.127] [0.218] [0.252] [0.154] [0.245]
Contiguity 1.010*** 1.017*** 1.059*** 0.819** 0.956** 1.824** 1.304** 1.249***
[0.367] [0.370] [0.375] [0.404] [0.411] [0.792] [0.512] [0.388]
Log GDP per cap -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 0.033 0.01 -0.202*** -0.028 -0.054
[0.060] [0.060] [0.059] [0.042] [0.075] [0.077] [0.047] [0.076]
(1) * (2) Security proxy, 
based on incidents 
located in  third 
countries -46.543* -50.140* -84.532*** -48.863** -55.217* -50.858 -52.697** -51.146*
[25.118] [25.573] [30.175] [22.930] [28.940] [32.766] [24.634] [30.659]
Security proxy* Number 
of Victims higher than 1 
std -71.298
[55.903]
Security proxy * 
Number of Victims 
higher than 5 std -166.112** -171.595** -89.614* -235.212** -36.754 43.36 -245.514**
[77.344] [73.851] [51.857] [103.924] [45.437] [53.261] [103.774]




t0 -0.161 -0.195* -0.165 -0.039 -0.332*** 0.233 -0.03 -0.340**
[0.111] [0.105] [0.108] [0.118] [0.104] [0.214] [0.145] [0.139]
t-1 -0.194** -0.177* -0.141 -0.067 -0.226** 0.019 0.098 -0.261**
[0.087] [0.091] [0.095] [0.102] [0.092] [0.169] [0.117] [0.112]
t-2 -0.074 -0.103 -0.083 0.018 -0.161** 0.039 0.122 -0.206***
[0.068] [0.064] [0.066] [0.086] [0.066] [0.138] [0.111] [0.063]
t-3 -0.157** -0.151** -0.141** -0.027 -0.238*** 0.106 0.064 -0.261***
[0.065] [0.063] [0.066] [0.080] [0.072] [0.149] [0.108] [0.075]
t-4 -0.102** -0.121** -0.090* -0.035 -0.169*** 0.045 0.036 -0.192***
[0.048] [0.050] [0.051] [0.069] [0.046] [0.116] [0.087] [0.044]
t-5 -0.043 -0.057 -0.047 0.063 -0.164* 0.051 0.127* -0.160**
[0.060] [0.056] [0.058] [0.054] [0.084] [0.117] [0.067] [0.068]
t-6 -0.069 -0.054 -0.047 0.045 -0.134* 0.11 0.098 -0.138**
[0.078] [0.070] [0.073] [0.089] [0.070] [0.160] [0.116] [0.062]
t-7 -0.025 -0.04 -0.023 0.048 -0.116* 0.212 0.082 -0.116*
[0.064] [0.057] [0.060] [0.062] [0.061] [0.137] [0.099] [0.064]
t-8 -0.094 -0.103 -0.09 -0.016 -0.209** -0.018 0.096 -0.175**
[0.082] [0.076] [0.078] [0.087] [0.082] [0.157] [0.097] [0.076]
t-9 -0.094 -0.112 -0.104 -0.035 -0.227*** 0.022 0.048 -0.178**
[0.084] [0.081] [0.082] [0.098] [0.080] [0.214] [0.132] [0.084]
t-10 -0.072 -0.065 -0.065 -0.028 -0.167 0.23 0.117 -0.101
[0.094] [0.094] [0.095] [0.112] [0.108] [0.191] [0.130] [0.106]
Log of religion fractions 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.232*** 0.196*** 0.274*** 0.06 0.197*** 0.286***
[0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.065] [0.087] [0.095] [0.071] [0.092]
Fixed effects:
_ product (SITC 5 digits)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
_ year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 673196 673196 673196 322151 308696 33021 103192 351045
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.1 0.19 0.3
Robust Standard errors provided in brackets with clustering by exporter
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Terrorism and Security Related Effects: Victims, Partner Size, 'Just in Time' and Networks

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant 0.842*** 0.057 -0.006 -0.18 -0.564** -0.156 -0.05 -0.687***
[0.119] [0.049] [0.150] [0.133] [0.215] [0.160] [0.135] [0.200]
Log GDP exporter 0.807*** 0.257 0.683*** 0.543*** 0.631***
[0.069] [1.503] [0.101] [0.082] [0.146]
Log Weighted Distance -1.471*** -0.837*** -0.319 0.515 -0.522** -0.249 0.741***
[0.185] [0.284] [0.231] [0.378] [0.219] [0.183] [0.274]
English Common Language  0.925*** 0.138 0.083 -0.465 -0.046 0.041 -0.600*
[0.149] [0.286] [0.220] [0.341] [0.298] [0.214] [0.355]
Log GDP per cap 0.07 1.072 -0.167* 0.019 -0.182 -0.189* 0.018 -0.181
[0.094] [1.463] [0.096] [0.084] [0.142] [0.110] [0.085] [0.138]
(1) * (2) Security proxy, based on 
incidents located in  third 
countries -88.522* -76.182***
[51.092] [26.398]
(1) * (2) Security proxy, based on 
incidents located in  country i 37.594* 9.858
[19.318] [9.234]
Log of number of B. visas -0.272** 0.084 0.536*** -0.028 0.134* 0.693***
[0.120] [0.087] [0.130] [0.077] [0.069] [0.155]
Control variables Military interstate Disputes
(lagged over 10 years),
Same governance than US,
Fixed effects:
_ product (SITC 5 digits) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
_ year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
_Product*Exporter yes
Anderson IV relevance test (Chi2) 49.66 16000 56000
Pvalue  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Hansen overidentification test 2.95 2.83 4.08
Pvalue  [0.399] [0.411] [0.252]
Period 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002 1997-2002
Observations 98953 98953 4184 13629 45027 4184 13629 45027
R-squared 0.76 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.29
2/ Log GDP exporter has been moved to left hand side in Instrumental variable regressions as it was multicolinnear to Log of number of visas (VIF related to GDP=105 and VIF related to Log 
number of visas=99)
Table 7: Visas, Networks and US imports
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Military interstate Disputes
Same governance than US
(lagged over 10 years),
NB:1/ In VI regressions, Log of number of visas is instrumented by the security proxy variables based on incidents in third countries and orgin countries and the rest of variables in  model 1
Robust Standard errors provided in brackets with clustering by exporter
(lagged over 10 years), 
Same governance than US, 
Model 1: Impact of 
incidents on business 
Visas allowance
Model 2: Impact of business visas allowance on US imports
Product and year effects
Log of religion fractions
Civil war,
Instrumental Variables regression
Log of religion fractions
Military interstate Disputes
Civil war,
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